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NOTES AND COMMENT
Today there is no such pressure upon one accused of crime.
A defendant has been made a competent witness in his own behalf.39
HIe may speak, and when he can refute the charges brought against
him by so doing, yet fails to testify, the inference of guilt arises. To
permit comment on such failure to forward an explanation is to
recognize and validate an existing fact.
If the amendment to the New York Code of Criminal Procedure
proposed by the Judicial Council is so worded as to allow the prose-
cuting attorney to comment on the defendant's failure to testify
only when the evidence against the accused is such that, were he
innocent, he could refute the charges against him, then it may well
be considered constitutional, just and expedient. But it must be
borne in mind that until the prosecution has made out a case against
the defendant calling for a reply other than that furnished by his
witnesses, till then his silence cannot be considered an indication of
guilt, and no comment thereupon should be permitted.
G. ROBERT ELLEGAARD.
THE EFFECT OF THE DEPRESSION ON THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES
OF THE TRUSTEE IN RELATION TO TRUST FUND INVESMENTS.
The trustee who has acted prudently, with reasonable diligence,
and in good faith will not be held liable for trust fund losses caused
by the depression. "Executors I and trustees cannot be watchers of
the tape, nor gamblers in stocks," declared Surrogate Slater in In re
Winburn.2 "There is no need for executors to jettison worthwhile
stock during a financial panic." The Winburn. case further indicates
that if "worthwhile" or "seasoned" securities decline because of a
general business depression, the trustee has done all that a reasonable
man can do, and is not to be held liable for any loss. 3 Whether the
security is "seasoned" or not is determined through the media of
several tests: "What has been the history of the companies during
a period of years? Have they paid fair dividends regularly? Have
they a proper capital structure? Are they wisely officered? Has a
successful business continued over a period of time? Have they
Supra note 19.
1Both the executor's and trustee's investment duties and liabilities have
been treated alike. In re Kent's Estate, 146 Misc. 155, 159, 261 N. Y. Supp.
698 (1932).
'140 Misc. 18, 22, 249 N. Y. Supp. 758, 763 (1931) (Executor consulted
Moody's Book of Stock Ratings).
'it re Winburn, supra note 2; see Matter of Thompson, 41 Misc.
420, 84 N. Y. Supp. 1111 (1903).
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achieved a standing in commercial circles? Have they behind them
an established dividend record over a period of years ?" 4
The trustee must make a reasonable and diligent effort in good
faith 5 to apply these tests. In New York, Section 265 of the Sur-
rogate's Act requires the trustee to be "without fault." This was
recently construed to mean "a common sense standard of prudence
and proper diligence," 6 so that the tests remain the same. An ex-
emption by the testator of the trustee from all liability, except if he
is grossly negligent, does not relieve the trustee from complying with
Section 265. 7 An error in judgment, however, does not necessarily
mean that the trustee is imprudent or not diligent.
8
This standard of prudence and proper diligence is, as we shall
see, the ultimate test employed by the courts to ascertain the trustee's
liability for losses to the trust fund due to the depression, no mat-
ter what type of trust, be it mandatory, discretionary, or the trust
without specific instructions for the trustee. Whether the trustee
has complied with the standard can only be determined by an ex-
amination of the peculiar circumstances surrounding each case,9 and
the effect of six years of economic stringency upon the circum-
stances has been duly noted by the courts.
The duties and liabilities of the trustee, to whom the settlor or
testator has given discretion to make the original investment of the
fund, have undoubtedly been influenced by the depression. Once
there has been an investment by a discretionary trustee in "seasoned
securities" a general depression cannot create liability in a trustee
for resulting losses.10 Whether the securities are seasoned or not
is determined, as we have said, by prudent and diligent examination.
When such examination reveals "a wildly fluctuating market like that
of 1929, with uncertainty as to railroad bond payments and wide-
spread mortgage foreclosures" one "should condone the trustee's hesi-
tancy in investing even though he must keep the funds constantly
invested or subject himself to a possible surcharge of a legal rate
'In re Winburn, supra note 2; see In re Leonard, 118 Misc. 598, 193
N. Y. Supp. 916 (1922).
'In re Stort's Estate, 142 Misc. 54, 253 N. Y. Supp. 834 (1931).
'In re Drake's Estate, 152 Misc. 395, 274 N. Y. Supp. 198, 200 (1934).
7In re Jarvis, 110 Misc. 5, 180 N. Y. Supp. 324 (1920) ; In re Curley's
Will, 151 Misc. 664, 272 N. Y. Supp. 489, 501 (1934) (Such exemption "is a
nugatory provision amounting to nothing more than a waste of good, white
paper").
'Matter of Lazar, 134 Misc. 261, 247 N. Y. Supp. 230 (1930).
1 In re Parson's Estate, 143 Misc. 368, 257 N. Y. Supp. 339 (1932). "Each
case of this class is sui generis, and the decision of this court should not be
taken as a controlling precedent for other cases." See Matter of Lazar, supra
note 8. The standard is widely used. It re Curran's Estate, 312 Pa. 416,
167 At. 567 (1933) ; Platt v. Jones, 38 P. (2d) 703 (Ore. 1934) and 39 P. (2d)
955 (Ore. 1935) ; see 2 PERRY, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1935) §914.
"In re Winburn, supra note 2.
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of interest." " If the trustee, authorized to invest in "non-legals"
(securities not included in statutory list), invested in guaranteed
mortgage certificates in March, 1931, when such certificates were
readily saleable, he would not be held liable for losses due to the
stagnant condition that occurred much later in 1932.12 The courts
do not regard guaranteed mortgage certificates as a speculation, and
the trustee was considered, therefore, to have acted prudently and
diligently. Nor do the courts regard an investment in mortgage par-
ticipation certificates as a speculation 13 since they have been de-
clared legal by statute,' 4 and an investment in "legals" is, prinua facie,
proper.
The caution taught by this and former depressions is respon-
sible for a series of statutes requiring the investment, when dis-
cretion or direction to invest is not specifically given by the settlor
of trust funds in a list of conservative securities.' 5 Some of these
statutes are mandatory' 6 and violation of any of their provisions
creates an absolute liability for any loss.17 Impliedly, the trustee has
the absolute duty to convert securities not on the list, for it is just as
dangerous to retain as to purchase non-legals. The mandatory statute,
however, is not to be followed blindly. A measure of prudence and
diligence is still required of the trustee, and when he observes that
a security on the list has defaulted in either principal or interest, he
must either convert or refuse to purchase it.'
s
The numerous fatalities among legals during the depression
moved the New York legislature to pass a statute arbitrarily ex-
' Robinson and Robinson, Trustee's Investments in Massachusetts (1935)
14 B. U. L. Rzv. 88, at 90. See also Forbes v. Ware, 72 Mass. 306, 52 N. E.
447 (1891).
"In re De Winter's Will, 154 Misc. 50, 276 N. Y. Supp. 576 (1934).
"Matter of Jacob's Will, 152 Misc. 139, 273 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1934) ; Mat-
ter of Frazer, 150 Misc. 43, 268 N. Y. Supp. 477 (1933) ; In re De Winter's
Will, supra note 12; Note (1935) 48 HARV. L. REv. 1162; Leach, Lessons front
the Depression it; the Drafting of Wills and Trusts (1934) 18 MINN. L. REv.
237; Recent Decision (1933) 8 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 373; Note (1934) 34 COL.
L. REV. 663.
"'Amendment, N. Y. BANKING L. 1917, c. 385; see McKINNEY, TRUST
INVESTMENTS (1927) 29, 354 (interpreting similar statutes) ; N. Y. DEEDENT'S
ESTATE LAW (1934) §111; N. Y. PERS. PROP. L. (1897) §21.
"When no discretion or direction is specifically given, trustee must
conform with the statute. Matter of Harriman's Estate, 142 Misc. 164, 254
N. Y. Supp. 158 (1931) ; Matter of Surpless' Estate, 143 Misc. 48, 255 N. Y.
Supp. 730 (1932).
" Cal. Gen. Laws of 1931, Act 652, §105 (trust companies only); Fla.
Laws of 1931, c. 15064; IowA CODE (1931) §12772 (proposed investments must
be submitted first to the court and all investments must be made from the list) ;
ORE. CODE (1930) §§22, 1216; Wis. STAT. (1931) §§198, 18(5), 231, 232; see
Bogert, The Trustee's Duty With Regard to Conversion of Investments (1934)
1 U. CHIC. L. REv. 27, n. 74; Note (1934) 47 HARV. L. REV. 510.
17Estate of Fouks, 213 Wis. 550, 252 N. W. 160 (1934); Schroeder v.
American Nat. Red Cross, 254 N. W. 371 (Wis. 1934). But cf. In re Lawson,
244 N. W. 739 (Iowa 1932).
Is 1 BoGmT, TRUSTS (1935) 44.
1935 ]
78 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10
cluding from computation the years 1931, 1932 and 1933 if their
inclusion in the analysis would cause railroad bonds to become in-
eligible for investment. 19 The prudent and diligent trustee may in-
vest without liability in railroad bonds that were legal in 1930, and
may disregard their status during the depression. But if the rail-
road had defaulted, it would seem that the statute would not prevent
the courts from holding the investing trustee to be imprudent.
20
The courts have repeatedly refused to state in general terms
when the prudent and reasonably diligent trustee should sell invest-
ments during a declining market.21 The trustee, after a diligent and
prudent examination of the peculiar circumstances of the case, must
decide for himself when to convert. In Matter of Lazar,2 2 the
trustee sold out, during the first months of the depression, an ac-
count of high-grade speculative stock. The court held that he had
converted within a reasonable time. In In re Pettigrew's Estate,2 3
the executors revealed in an accounting filed in 1932 that they had
retained certain securities and realty that had been purchased by the
testator. The court, in absolving the executors, said, "For the precip-
itous decline in the market and the general depression which fol-
lowed, the executors cannot be held to account. In not then selling,
they did as hundreds of thousands of other ordinarily prudent and
cautious persons." The trustee or executor has been considered
properly diligent, even though he was able,24 yet refused to, sell non-
legal securities six months after the great crash of 1929 at a higher
level than their value at the time of appraisal of the estate. The
court held that "most men of that degree of prudence and caution
that we call ordinary did not foresee" that a widespread decline would
follow the 1931 recovery. In In re Parson's Estate 25 the trustee re-
tained investments in dividend-paying securities, ordinarily highly re-
garded, but which declined in the "financial cataclysm." 26 In In re
Stort's Estate 27 the testator gave the trustee full discretionary powers
to sell, invest, and reinvest the proceeds. Here, too, the trustee was
"Laws of 1932 and 1933, Ch. 5, c. 329.
'0 BOGERT, 10c. cit. mpra note 16.
2It re Westfield Trust Co., 117 N. J. Eq. 429, 176 Atl. 101 (1935) ; it re
Pettigrew's Estate, 115 N. J. Eq. 401, 171 Atl. 152 (Ch. 1934) ; Matter of
Jacob's Will, 152 Misc. 139, 273 N. Y. Supp. 239 (1934) ; Creed v. McAleer,
275 Mass. 353, 357, 175 N. E. 761 (1931) ; see BOGERT, 10C. cit. supra note 16;
Recent Decision (1933) 30 CoL. L. REv. 166; Notes (1932) 77 A. L. R. 505.
139 Misc. 261, 247 N. Y. Supp. 230 (1930).
2115 N. J. Eq. 401, 171 Atl. 152, 155 (1934).
'In re Westfield Trust Co., 117 N. J. Eq. 429, 176 Atl. 101, 103 (1935)
(authorized to sell or retain).
21143 Misc. 368, 257 N. Y. Supp. 339 (1932) (trustee consulted bankers
and brokers and kept informed of market).
2 At page 343, a usual characterization, revealing what importance the
court will attach to this factor in determining the trustee's liability. In re
Westfield, 117 N. J. Eq. 429, 176 Atl. 101, 102 (1935) ; In re Pettigrew, 115
N. J. Eq. 401, 171 Atl. 152, 155 (Ch. 1934).
142 Misc. 54, 253 N. Y. Supp. 834, 837 (1931).
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not held liable for retaining securities through the depression, the
court declaring that "The rules noted in Matter of Pollock's Will 28
(good faith and reasonable diligence) are to be applied with even
greater liberality in favor of a fiduciary who lawfully retains non-
legal investments made by the testator, in the reasonable expectation
that they may regain some of their depreciated value, particularly
in abnormal times as the present."
The court, apparently, believes that any reasonable retention of
an investment made by the testator can be justified by existence of a
depression. It is to be noted that Stort's securities, although non-
legals, were not termed "speculative," as in Matter of Lazar,29 where
a sale of speculative securities during October and November of 1929
was considered a prudent act. In In re Stumpp's Estate 30 (a recent
New York case), executors, authorized to sell or retain securities-
common shares formerly held by the testator-had refused to sell,
although they could have obtained in 1931 a price better than that
at which the securities were inventoried. Such retention, Surrogate
Delehanty declared, was a speculation, and held the executors liable.
He sounded a warning to all trustees and executors who took In re
Stort's Estate and Matter of Clark 31 too literally.
"The courts have recognized and will continue to recognize
the unusual burden cast upon fiduciaries by the unprecedented
shrinkage in values beginning in the fall of 1929. Similar
recognition was accorded by the courts to conditions which
followed prior industrial depressions. 32 Nothing in Matter of
Clark warrants any fiduciary to ask as of course that losses
in his trust shall be excused because of the depression. Fidu-
ciaries who have honestly struggled with a difficult situation
without seeking personal gain at the expense of their trusts
will be given the benefit of that consideration which should be
extended to good faith, honest effort and a fair performance
of fiduciary duty. The fundamentals of fiduciary duty remain
unchanged and misuse and deliberate mishandling of fiduciary
property -for selfish ends must be condemned by the courts.
Speculation still is forbidden to fiduciaries. Prompt liquida-
tion of speculative assets is still the standard rule." 33
34 Misc. 212, 217, 236 N. Y. Supp. 149 (1929).
" Supra note 22.
= 153 Misc. 92, 274 N. Y. Supp. 466 (1934).
'257 N. Y. 132, 117 N. E. 397 (1931), 77 A. L. R. 499 (1932).
= The trustee has been similarly treated during previous depressions. In
Matter of Gray, 27 Hun 455 (N. Y. 1890), a case arising out of the 1873
panic, the trustee held securities that dropped from $80 per share to $15 per
share but was not liable since no reasonable person would expect such a
depression in prices. See also Beam v. Patterson, 83 N. J. Eq. 628, 92 Atl.
351 (1914) (dealing with the 1907 crisis).
'In re Watson's Estate, 145 Misc. 425, 261 N. Y. Supp. 327 (1931).
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citing In re Haminersley's Estate.34  Existence of a depression, it
seems, will permit a reasonable retention of non-legals that are not
speculative, even though the trustee has been either directed or au-
thorized to sell.
Professor Bogert is also of the opinion that only in extraordinary
cases, where reasonable diligence and prudence is shown, may a trus-
tee retain non-legals, whether delivered to him by the testator or
bought by himself.35 Cases arising during a depression are consid-
ered extraordinary. Matter of Kent3 6 was one of many such cases
and Surrogate Foley explains therein what is meant by "reasonable
diligence and prudence." The executor had retained stock purchased
by the testator despite a decline during the depression from $90 per
share to $40 per share. But before the executor made his decision
to retain the securities he made frequent examinations of the com-
pany's financial affairs through examination of the current reports
in three different publications of recognized standing in financial
circles together with various indices and reports Qf general business
conditions and situations in the electrical industry specifically. Such
activity, the court believed, revealed an exercise of reasonable dili-
gence and proper prudence. Another concrete example of the proper
degree of diligence and prudence is given in Matter of Clark,37 where
the trustee retained sugar stock during a precipitous decline, one
company's stock falling from $22 per share to $7 per share and the
other from $12 per share to $0.50 per share. The trustee consulted
authorities on sugar, persons of note in business and Stock Exchange
Members. The stocks, both the trustee and the court found, were
those of companies with unimpaired assets and a sound cash position.
The testator had declared the trustee to be "without any personal
liability" as to investments and directed him to continue the invest-
ments. The court held 38 that the corporate trustee, aside from the
immunity clause, had performed his duty diligently and prudently
and therefore was not liable, because although "it may have been
deficient in prevision and prophecy, it was not lacking in the exer-
cise of care." Once the trustee had consulted the various authorities
and followed their advice in good faith, the courts will consider him,
no matter how poor a prophet he may turn out to be, to have acted
diligently and prudently.3 9 A case 40 arising out of an earlier de-
pression explains this view:
180 N. Y. Supp. 887, not reported in state report (1920).
BOG RT, loc. cit. spra note 16.
146 Misc. 155, 261 N. Y. Supp. 698 (1932).
= Supra note 31.
' Matter of Clark, supra note 31.
' Ibid.; Matter of Kent, supra note 36; Matter of Lazar, supra note 22;
Chemical Bank and Trust Co. v. Reynaud, 150 Misc. 821, 270 N. Y. Supp.
301 (1933).
" Matter of Thompson, supra note 3, at 422.
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"To foresee such periods of general depression, or periods
where high prices prevail, is the constant effort of the keen-
est intellects in the financial world, but notwithstanding their
tireless vigilance and efforts stimulated by the hope of great
gains, they frequently find such knowledge too high for them.
The law does not require such prescience of administrators."
When the trustee is given full discretion to sell the testator's
securities, and these are not speculative, judging from such ratings
as Moody's, Poor's or Standard Statistical Service, they are not to
be "timidly and hastily sacrificed." 41 Here the standard of prudence
and diligence surely applies. Surrogate Slater continues, "Even
where there is a direction to sell * * * a reasonable time must be
given and what that shall be, shall be determined in each case by its
own facts." This relieves the trustee of a possible unjust penalty,
for, if a trustee were forced to sell securities, by reason of a manda-
tory provision, during a declining market, and subsequently prices
went up, he would be liable for the difference in prices, 42 not be-
cause of any negligence on his part, but simply because he obeyed the
trust instrument's provisions. The allowance of a reasonable time to
sell makes it unnecessary for the trustee to obey blindly the testa-
tor's or settlor's will.43
When the trustee is given the express authority to retain securi-
ties,44 he may hold them until it becomes very apparent to him that it
will be disastrous to keep them any longer.45  But the trustee must
exercise "ordinarily good business judgment of foresight" to secure
facts revealing the disastrous situation,4 6 so that even though the
trustee is authorized to retain the securities, he is still subject to the
standard of prudence and diligence in the performance of his duties.
Where the trustee has been expressly directed to retain the stock
of a certain corporation, the trustee may, nevertheless, sell such stock
if the "marketability of the product" or "capital structure" has been
altered by the depression, or where "the risks and vicissitudes" have
increased.47 No matter how severe the provision of retention is,
" In re Winburn, 140 Misc. 18, 22, 249 N. Y. Supp. 758, 763 (1931). Even
though the will contains the direction that the executor must sell the securities
"as soon as may be" the executor may retain them as long as he thinks
prudent. Matter of Varet, 181 App. Div. 446, aff'd, 224 N. Y. 537 (1918).
"Matter of Mercantile Trust Co., 210 N. Y. 83, 103 N. E. 884 (1913);
Beam v. Patterson, 83 N. J. Eq. 628, 92 AtI. 351 (1914).
"In re Schinasi's Estate, 153 Misc. 114, 274 N. Y. Supp. 480 (1934), 93
A. L. R. 1521 (1935).
"lIn re Jarvis, 110 Misc. 5, 180 N. Y. Supp. 324 (1920).
" Matter of Clark, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931) ; In re Taylor's
Estate, 277 Pa. 518, 529, 121 Atl. 310 (1923), 37 A. L. R. 553 (1925).
"In re Linnard's Estate, 299 Pa. 32, 148 Atl. 912, 914 (1930).
" Mertz v. Guaranty Trust Co., 247 N. Y. 137, 141, 159 N. E. 188 (1923),
57 A. L. R. 1114 (1928); In re Harriman's Estate, 142 Misc. 164, 254 N. Y.
Supp. 158 (1931).
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equity will, when an economic crisis has caused securities to become
unproductive and greatly impaired in value, imply or read into the
will a power of sale in order to avert the destruction of the trust res.
The court in Matter of Piditzer 4s did exactly that, permitting the
sale of stock because of a considerable decline in value.
The Massachusetts courts have held the trustee liable for failure
to diversify his holdings, 49 but in the face of a general decline in the
market the trustee who has invested the entire trust fund in one se-
curity will not be held liable for non-diversification. 50 The New
York courts, however, have never definitely required the trustee to
diversify his holdings, and the depression has not caused the court
to alter its position. 51
It may be said that the trustee who has consulted diligently the
proper authorities in the manner suggested in Matter of Clark, 5 2
Matter of Kent,53 Matter of Lazar 5 4 and Matter of Hurl-
but,55 and has drawn from them a reasonable conclusion as to whether
he should sell or not, will be relieved by the courts of liability for
ensuing losses.
A reasonable quantum of the prophetic sense seems a desirable
constituent of the trustee's nature. Judge Kellogg in Matter of
Clark 56 probably intended to condone only that "deficiency in pre-
vision" from which the ordinarily prudent and diligent person suffers.
He must have recognized that some degree of foresight is exercised
43Matter of Pulitzer, 139 Misc. 575, 249 N. Y. Supp. 87 (1931) ; Gleason
v. Hastings, 278 Mass. 409, 180 N. E. 129 (1932) (the court has the power
to order a conversion in the case of an emergency) ; In re Garvin, 256 N. Y.
518, 177 N. E. 24 (1931) (trustee, even though the testator expressed the
desire that stock be retained, cannot permit it to become worthless. He must
pay full value to child of testator who had not acquiesced in his retention) ;
In re Roche's Will, 233 App. Div. 236, 251 N. Y. Supp. 347 (4th Dept. 1931)
(although the testator positively directed retention of certain bank stocks
[non-legals] the trustee would be bound to sell in view of the shrinkage in value
or yield, or else be liable for loss if it were shown that such retention was
unreasonable and imprudent).
'
9
"n re Davis, 183 Mass. 499, 67 N. E. 604 (1903). See RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS (Tent. Draft. No. 4, §220, Comment c); Note (1935) 48 HARV. L.
REv. 347.
'First National Bank of Boston v. Truesdale Hospital, 192 N. E. 150,
not reported in state report (Mass. 1934).
'In re Balfe's Will, 150 Misc. 21, 270 N. Y. Supp. 301 (1933).
'Supra note 31.
146 Misc. 155, 261 N. Y. Supp. 198 (1932).
" 138 Misc. 261, 247 N. Y. Supp. 230 (1930) (consultation with broker
handling stock is sufficient).
210 App. Div. 456, 206 N. Y. Supp. 448 (2d Dept. 1924) (consultation,
however, with a trust company interested in the sale of the bonds in question
does not excuse the trustee from liability in purchasing bonds of a shipping
company on the verge of the collapse of the shipping boom. Trustee had
discretion to invest in what he thought best but nevertheless he must act
prudently, and he did not so act).
'Supra note 31.
[ VOL. 10
NOTES AND COMMENT
by every man and that the same should at least be expected of a
trustee.
It has been decided that this duty of prophecy is satisfied if the
trustee "merely did as hundreds of thousands of other ordinarily pru-
dent and cautious persons did" 57 and even though "most men of that
degree of prudence and caution that we call ordinary did not fore-
see" 58 the "financial cataclysm," the courts cannot harshly condemn
them.
ARTHUR S. MARGULIS.
DUAL OFFICE HOLDING--FEDERAL, STATE AND MUNICIPAL.
It is a fundamental principle of the law of government that
under certain circumstances a person may not simultaneously hold
two governmental offices. The rule had its origin in the common
law, and has been reiterated and extended by constitutional provi-
sions, statutory enactment and executive order. The common law
rule pertaining to dual office holding is that the acceptance by a
public officer of a second incompatible office terminates per se the
ability of the acceptor to hold the first office as effectively as would
a resignation therefrom.I The theory of incompatibility underlying
the common law rule is set forth in People ex rel. Ryan v. Green
as follows:
"Incompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the
functions of the two; as judge and clerk of the same court-
officer who presents his personal accounts subject to audit,
and officer whose duty it is to audit it. * * * The force of the
word in its application to this matter is, that from the nature
and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not
to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antag-
onism which would result in the attempt by one person to
faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one toward
the incumbent of the other." 2
Whether the offices involved are incompatible is a judicial ques-
tion,3 and the true test to be applied is whether the two offices are
"lin re Pettigrew's Estate, 115 N. J. Eq. 401, 171 Atl. 152 (1934).
'In re Westfield Trust Co., mspra note 21.
'Millard v. Thatcher, 2 T. R. 81, English Rul. Cas. 320 (1787); Rex v.
Patteson, 4 B. & A. D. 9 (1832); State v. Bus, 135 Mo. 325, 36 S. W. 636
(1896) ; Oliver v. Jersey City, 63 N. J. L. 96, 42 Atl. 782 (1899) ; State v.
Brinkerhoff, 66 Tex. 45, 17 S. W. 109 (1886); MEcHEM, THE LAW OF OFFICES
AND OFFICERS (1890) §420.
2 People ex rel. Ryan v. Green, 58 N. Y. 295, 304 (1874).
3 Ibid.
19351
